CAMS-FCI Advanced CAMS-Financial Crimes Investigations Questions and Answers

A product of analysis is a conclusion or inference that is derived from facts or judgments, using analytical techniques or tools. Option B is a product of analysis because it implies that the investigator has used a tool or technique, such as a threshold analysis, to identify a pattern of structured cash deposits that may indicate an attempt to evade reporting requirements. The other options are facts or judgments that can be verified by evidence or observation.

References: Advanced CAMS-FCI Certification Handbook, page 23.

According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS) Manual , 6th edition, if a bank's transaction surveillance system triggers an alert for a deposit of 250.000 USD into a client's account, the bank should take the following actions:

• Request information and documentation from the client on the background of the transaction (CAMS Manual, 6th edition, page 46).
• Contact the client advisor to learn if he has any insight on the transaction background (CAMS Manual, 6th edition, page 47).
• Review the transaction background in the bank's transaction platform (CAMS Manual, 6th edition, page 47).

Discarding the alert as a false positive hit and reviewing the alert if the deposit is made in cash should not be done.

The bank should request additional information and documentation from the client to better understand the nature of the transaction. Additionally, the bank should reach out to the client advisor to learn if they have any insight on the transaction background. Finally, the bank should review the transaction background in the bank's transaction platform to determine if any additional alerts or anomalies are present. (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, Pages 117-118)

The illegal activity that the investigator has reasonable grounds to suspect Richard Aston of is aftermarket sales of entertainment admission tickets. This is because aftermarket sales of entertainment admission tickets involve reselling tickets for events, concerts, festivals, etc. at a higher price than their face value, often through online platforms or scalpers. This practice can be illegal or unethical, depending on the jurisdiction and the terms and conditions of the original ticket seller. The investigator should look for indicators of aftermarket sales of entertainment admission tickets, such as high volume or frequency of incoming payments from various individuals, correlation between incoming payments and major events or conferences, and discrepancy between the customer’s profile and the nature of the transactions. The other options are incorrect because:

A. Embezzling from the hotel is not likely, as it would involve stealing money or property from the hotel by an employee or a person in a position of trust. There is no evidence that Richard Aston works for or has access to the hotel’s assets.

C. Human trafficking is not probable, as it would involve exploiting people for forced labor or commercial sexual exploitation. There is no indication that Richard Aston is involved in any form of human trafficking or has any connection to victims or perpetrators.

D. Sports betting is not plausible, as it would involve wagering money on the outcome of sporting events or games. There is no sign that Richard Aston is engaged in any sports betting activity or has any association with bookmakers or gamblers.

References:

Advanced CAMS-FCI Certification | ACAMS, Section 2: Investigating Financial Crimes, page 10

TicketSwap: The safest way to buy and sell tickets

Ticketing 101 | Ticketmaster

10 Types of Tickets For Events (+ Why & When To Use Them) - Eventbrite

Financial institutions should perform the following actions to ensure proper data governance:

Establish an appropriate data management method for collecting and storing information. This is important to ensure that the data is consistent, reliable, and accessible for various purposes, such as risk assessment, compliance reporting, and customer service. Data management methods may include defining data standards, policies, and procedures; implementing data quality controls and validation checks; and using appropriate data storage systems and formats.

Ensure the accuracy of customer identification records and transaction records and appropriately manage data as a prerequisite for the effective use of IT systems. This is important to comply with the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) requirements, such as customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, and suspicious activity reporting. Accurate and complete customer and transaction data also enables financial institutions to use IT systems more effectively for data analysis, risk management, and decision making.

Periodically validate integrity and accuracy of information used for IT systems such as customer information, customer identification records, and transaction records. This is important to ensure that the data remains up-to-date, relevant, and reliable over time. Data validation may include verifying the source and quality of the data; identifying and correcting any errors or inconsistencies; and updating or deleting any obsolete or redundant data.

References:

• Data Governance for Financial Institutions - Capgemini
• Small and Medium-Sized Deposit-Taking Institutions (SMSBs) Capital and Liquidity Requirements - OSFI

One of the actions that is part of the enhanced due diligence process is collecting beneficial ownership details regarding the client’s account. This is important to identify the natural persons who ultimately own or control the client, and to assess the potential risks associated with them. According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), beneficial ownership information should include1:

• The name, nationality, and country of residence of each beneficial owner.
• The date of birth or incorporation of each beneficial owner.
• The nature and extent of the beneficial interest held by each beneficial owner.
• The means by which the beneficial ownership or control is exercised.

References:

FATF Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership

The SAR/STR should include any information that is relevant to the suspicious activity, such as the customer information, the transaction details, and any other indicators of potential money laundering or criminal activity. The fact that one of the transactors occasionally smelled of marijuana smoke is an indicator that the customer may be involved in the illicit drug trade, which is a predicate offense for money laundering. Therefore, this information should be included in the SAR/STR. References: Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide, page 25.

"The FATF measures the effectiveness of a country's efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing through a mutual evaluation process. During a mutual evaluation, the FATF assesses a country's legal and institutional framework, its implementation of measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and the effectiveness of its efforts. The FATF then issues a report with recommendations for improvement" [CAMS Study Guide 6th edition, page 15-16].

The best information to share at the very beginning of a well-written SAR/STR narrative is the purpose of the SAR/STR narrative and a general description of the known or alleged violation. This is because this information provides an overview of why the SAR/STR is being filed and what type of suspicious activity or transaction is involved. It also helps to capture the attention of the reader and set the tone for the rest of the narrative.

References: Reporting Suspicious Activity Certificate, Module 4, page 7.

The threat of US sanctions against foreign individuals and entities continues to exist despite the absence of a US nexus. This is stated in the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) manual on page 591, which states: “It is important to note that the threat of US sanctions against foreign individuals and entities continues to exist even when there is no direct US nexus (i.e., no US persons or assets involved).”

The investigator should review how the wire transfers were initiated first, because this could indicate the level of involvement and knowledge of the LLC account holders. If the wire transfers were initiated online or by phone, it could suggest that the account holders were trying to avoid face-to-face contact with the bank staff and reduce the chances of being questioned or identified. If the wire transfers were initiated in person at a branch, it could indicate that the account holders were confident or careless about their activities, or that they had some relationship with the bank staff. The method of initiation could also affect the quality and quantity of information collected by the bank about the wire transfers, such as the purpose, source, and destination of the funds. References: ACAMS Advanced Financial Crimes Investigations Certification Study Guide, page 65.

The correct answer is C because the FI is unable to obtain evidence of required licensing or registration despite suspicion of money transmitting, which is a red flag for money laundering and a violation of federal and state laws. Option A is incorrect because making several deposits in one month that appear to exceed their expected monthly income might not be indicative of suspicious activity, depending on the customer’s profile and source of funds. Option B is incorrect because receiving a large, one-time wire from a law firm might not be indicative of suspicious activity, depending on the customer’s relationship with the law firm and the purpose of the wire. Option D is incorrect because discovering a large number of securities transactions that appear to be related to day trading might not be indicative of suspicious activity, depending on the customer’s investment strategy and risk tolerance.

References: Money transmitter - Wikipedia; The Quick Guide To Money Transmitter Licenses - Surety Bond Insider; Financial Crime Typologies - Intermediate Certificate, Module 3.

The investigator should take the following investigative actions concerning the 100,000 USD wire transfer:

• Review the wire transfer protocols for this customer. This will help the investigator to determine if the wire transfer is consistent with the customer’s normal business activity and risk profile, or if it deviates from the established patterns or thresholds.
• Review regulations applicable to foreign currency trading transactions. This will help the investigator to assess if the wire transfer violates any laws or regulations related to currency exchange, such as reporting requirements, licensing requirements, or sanctions compliance.
• Locate and review licenses, registrations, and account operating agreements associated with the MTB account. This will help the investigator to verify if the MTB has the necessary authorization and documentation to conduct currency exchange transactions and if it has disclosed this activity to the FI. References: Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide, pages 32-33.

The condition that should be met to satisfy the regulator is that the program is drafted using a risk-based approach to avoid the FI being used as a conduit for criminal activities. A risk-based approach means that the FI identifies, assesses, and understands its exposure to financial crime risks and applies appropriate measures to mitigate them. This is consistent with the international standards and best practices for anti-financial crime compliance. The program being aligned with the financial industry’s anti-financial crime priorities, meeting the minimum requirements of anti-financial crime standards published by a financial industry association, or having no high-severity issues in internal auditing results are not sufficient to satisfy the regulator, as they do not necessarily reflect the specific risks faced by the FI or demonstrate its effectiveness in preventing and detecting financial crimes.

References: [Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide], page 14-15; [FATF Guidance on Risk-Based Approach for Effective Supervision], page 7-8.

The total suspicious transaction amount that the investigator should report is 659,000,000 USD. This is the sum of the two transactions involving the LLC and the state-run oil company, which are 59,000,000 USD and 600,000,000 USD respectively. The other transactions that the LLC made to other accounts, a money brokerage firm, and real estate purchases are not relevant to the question, as they are not part of the series of transactions that triggered the alert.

References: Advanced CAMS-FCI Certification | ACAMS

The best step for the investigator to take next is to request information about the beneficiaries related to the company. This will help to identify the ultimate beneficial owners of the funds and the purpose of the transactions. Requesting information from the company or filing a SAR/STR to the FIU where the company is located may not be feasible or effective, as the company may not cooperate or the FIU may not have jurisdiction over the offshore entity. Conducting an open-source search may provide some information about the ownership and registration of the company, but it may not be sufficient or reliable to determine the nature and legitimacy of the transactions.

References:

• SAR Narrative Guidance Package
• Best Practices for Drafting an STR or SAR

A more robust supervisory approach is needed by regulators when overseeing small- and medium-sized MSBs compared to larger MSBs for combatting TF because small- and medium-sized MSBs are more at risk of allowing transactions linked to TF due to the lack of skilled compliance resources. Small- and medium-sized MSBs may face challenges in implementing effective AML/CFT controls, such as conducting risk assessments, applying customer due diligence measures, monitoring transactions, detecting suspicious activities, and reporting to the authorities. They may also have limited access to training, guidance, and tools to enhance their compliance capabilities. Therefore, regulators need to provide more supervision and support to small- and medium-sized MSBs to ensure that they comply with the AML/CFT requirements and mitigate the TF risks.

References:

• Sustainable Growth for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises … - MDPI
• Lessons on Resilience for Small and Midsize Businesses - HBR

According to the CAMS study guide, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Regional Style Bodies are organizations created by the FATF to promote the implementation of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) measures in specific regions. One of the key characteristics of these bodies is the implementation of regional mutual evaluation procedures.

Regional mutual evaluations involve member countries evaluating each other's AML/CFT regimes to identify strengths and weaknesses and to develop best practices for improvement. This process allows for greater cooperation between countries and can help to identify and address regional AML/CFT risks more effectively. It also promotes consistency in AML/CFT standards and practices within the region.

The most concerning trading pattern for a compliance officer when a new customer has been onboarded in a securities firm is the customer accumulating securities of a low volume counter in small increments on a weekly basis. This type of behavior could indicate that the customer is attempting to obscure their identity or the true purpose of their trading activity, which can be indicative of money laundering or other suspicious activity. (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, Page 170).

The initial focus of the investigation should be to review the customer due diligence documents of each entity and examine the year of incorporation and onboarding channel, as this would help identify the beneficial owners, the source of funds, and the purpose of the business relationship. This would also help determine if the entities are shell companies or have any red flags that indicate potential misuse of legal persons. Using data analytics to extract and analyze the linkages between the different entities would be a subsequent step, not the initial one. Conducting a network link analysis on all customers of the bank would be too broad and time-consuming. Finding out whether customer A has relationships with other financial institutions would be relevant, but not the initial focus. References: [Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide], page 44-45; [FATF Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership], page 12-13.

Here is the exact information from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for Trust and Company Service Providers:

"Understanding the management and ownership structure of a trust is crucial in assessing the ML/TF risk it poses. This includes the identity of all settlors, trustees and beneficiaries, and their respective roles and responsibilities, as well as the nature and purpose of the trust."

"TCSPs should obtain and maintain up-to-date information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship, the source of funds and wealth, and where relevant, the source of funds or wealth of the settlor and beneficiaries."

Based on this information, the correct answers are A and D. Trust and Company Service Providers must understand the responsibility and authority in the structure, as well as the general purpose behind the structure in order to assess the overall risk of the trust and ensure that any transactions with the trust are legitimate.

The first valid step in the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) international cooperation process is for the central authority of the requesting country to send a letter of request to the central authority of the other country. The letter of request should provide a summary of the facts and information required, the reasons for the request, and any specific legal or procedural requirements that need to be met. (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, Page 233).

The purchase of airplane tickets after receiving multiple small deposits from a crowdfunding platform might suggest that the funds are being used to facilitate travel for terrorist purposes. The other options are not necessarily indicative of terrorist financing, as they could be explained by legitimate reasons or other types of financial crimes.

The correct answer is C and E. The investigator should provide additional information to the LE upon receiving a formal request, and gather all the information that would be useful for LE and recommend filing a SAR/STR. These steps are consistent with the best practices of conducting financial crime investigations and reporting suspicious activity. The investigator should not close the customer’s accounts or the investigation, as this may interfere with the ongoing LE inquiry and violate the FI’s policies and procedures. The investigator should also not contact local LE directly, as this may compromise the confidentiality of the investigation and the FIU’s authority. References:

• Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide, Chapter 4: Reporting Suspicious Activity, pages 40-411
• Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide, Chapter 5: Governance of an AFC Investigations Unit, pages 48-491
• Advanced CAMS-FCI Certification | ACAMS

Some of the negative impacts of illegal wildlife trade and environmental crimes are loss of potential tax proceeds and threats to biodiversity. Loss of potential tax proceeds occurs when illegal wildlife trade and environmental crimes evade taxation and customs duties, depriving governments of revenues that could be used for public services and development. Threats to biodiversity occur when illegal wildlife trade and environmental crimes endanger species, habitats, and ecosystems, reducing their resilience and ability to provide essential services for human well-being. Public health consequences and threats to a country’s political stability are not directly related to illegal wildlife trade and environmental crimes, but rather to other types of financial crimes such as money laundering, terrorism financing, or corruption.

References: [Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide], page 68-69; [FATF Report on Money Laundering from Environmental Crime], page 9-10.

The correct answer is A and C because these indicators suggest that the customer is using fraudulent documents and misrepresenting the goods to conceal the illicit nature of the transactions. Fentanyl traffickers often use front companies and falsified invoices to disguise their shipments as legitimate products, such as medical supplies or chemicals. Reviewing the invoices and transportation documents, as well as the FDA product certifications, can help to identify discrepancies or anomalies that indicate fraud or deception.

References: Fentanyl and Fentanyl Analogues: Federal Trends and Trafficking Patterns, page 18; Fentanyl Trafficking Offenses, page 2.

The instruction that the person in charge of the broker-dealer should provide to their employees is to take notes on the questions and comments made by the agents (A). This is because taking notes can help the employees to recall and document what happened during the search warrant execution, which can be useful for legal or regulatory purposes. According to ACAMS3, “the FI should instruct its staff to cooperate with LE agents during a search warrant execution, but also to take notes of what is being searched, seized, or asked by the agents” (p. 35). The FI should also “keep copies of any documents or records that are taken by LE agents” (p. 35).

The other instructions are not correct. The person in charge of the broker-dealer should not instruct their employees to sign consent forms permitting the agents to search employees’ offices (B), as this is unnecessary and potentially risky, as the agents already have a valid search warrant that authorizes them to search the premises. The person in charge of the broker-dealer should not instruct their employees to provide agents with unlimited access to customers’ personal data ©, as this could violate privacy or data protection laws, as well as compromise customer trust and confidentiality. The person in charge of the broker-dealer should not instruct their employees to volunteer information not requested by the agents that they think may be useful (D), as this could interfere with the LE investigation or expose them to legal or regulatory risks.

References:

• Introduction to Transnational Organized Crime
• ACAMS Law Enforcement and Financial Crimes Investigations eLearning Course Module
• Law Enforcement Requests and Actions

As part of an internal fraud investigation, an AML officer should gather information on the employee from coworkers and supervisors before the interview, as this can help to establish a baseline of the employee’s behavior, role, and responsibilities, and identify any red flags or anomalies. The other options are not consistent with best practices because they can compromise the integrity of the investigation, violate the employee’s rights, or discourage cooperation.

References: Advanced CAMS-FCI Certification Handbook, page 28.