JN0-636 Security, Professional (JNCIP-SEC) Questions and Answers

The IPS signature database is one of the major components of the intrusion prevention system (IPS). It contains definitions of different objects, such as attack objects, application signature objects, and service objects, that are used in defining IDP policy rules. As a response to new vulnerabilities, Juniper Networks periodically provides a file containing attack database updates on the Juniper Networks website. You can download this file to protect your network from new threats. Note: IPS does not need a separate license to run as a service on the SRX Series Firewall; however, a license is required for IPS updates1.

When you configure a chassis cluster, the two nodes back up each other, with one node acting as the primary device and the other as the secondary device, ensuring stateful failover of processes and services in the event of system or hardware failure. If the primary device fails, the secondary device takes over processing of traffic2.

To download and install the IPS signature database to a device operating in chassis cluster mode, you must perform the following steps:

• Download the IPS signature package from the Juniper Networks website to the primary node of the chassis cluster. You can use the request security idp security-package download CLI command or the Security Director user interface to download the package. Note: You must have a valid license key installed on the device to download the package3.
• Install the IPS signature package on the primary node of the chassis cluster. You can use the request security idp security-package install CLI command or the Security Director user interface to install the package. Note: You must reboot the primary node after installing the package3.
• Synchronize the IPS signature package from the primary node to the backup node of the chassis cluster. You can use the request security idp security-package install-backup CLI command or the Security Director user interface to synchronize the package. Note: You do not need to reboot the backup node after synchronizing the package3.

Therefore, the correct answer is A. You must download and install the IPS signature package on the primary node. The other options are incorrect because:

• B. The first synchronization of the backup node and the primary node is performed automatically after you install the package on the primary node. You do not need to perform it manually3.
• C. The first time you synchronize the IPS signature package from the primary node to the backup node, the primary node does not need to be rebooted. You only need to reboot the primary node after installing the package3.
• D. The IPS signature package does not need to be downloaded and installed on the primary and backup nodes separately. You only need to download and install it on the primary node and then synchronize it to the backup node3.

References:

• IDP Signature Database Overview
• Understanding IDP Signature Database for Migration
• Configuring Chassis Clustering on SRX Series Devices

According to the trace options output in the exhibit, the following statements are correct:

• This packet is part of an existing session. This is indicated by the line flow session id 0x00000000, hash 0x00000000, table 0x00000000, flow process exit, which shows that the packet matches an existing session entry in the flow table1.
• The SRX device is changing the destination address on this packet from 10.0.1.1 to 172.20.101.10. This is indicated by the line nat: translated 10.0.1.1->172.20.101.10, which shows that the packet undergoes destination NAT2.

The following statements are incorrect:

• The SRX device is changing the source address on this packet. There is no indication of source NAT in the trace options output2.
• This is the first packet in the session. The first packet in a session would have a different trace options output, which would include the line flow_first_inline_processing and show the creation of a new session entry in the flow table1.

References: 1: SRX Getting Started – Troubleshooting Traffic Flows and Session Establishment 2: SRX Getting Started - Configure NAT (Network Address Translation)

https://www.juniper.net/us/en/products-services/security/advanced-threat-prevention/

Certificate RenewalThe renewal of certificates is much the same as initial certificate enrollment except you are just replacing an old certificate(about to expire) on the VPN device with a new certificate. As with the initial certificate request, only manual renewal issupported. SCEP can be used to re-enroll local certificates automatically before they expire. Refer to Appendix D for moredetails.

The exhibit shows the output of the show security mka sessions summary command on an SRX Series device. This command displays the status of the MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) sessions on the device. In the output, we can see that there are two CAKs configured for the interface ge-0/0/1 - FFFF and EEEE. The CAK named FFFF has the type preceding and the status live. The CAK named EEEE has the type fallback and the status active.

The two statements that are true about the CAK status for the CAK named FFFF are:

• CAK is not used for encryption and decryption of the MACsec session. This is because the CAK is only used for authentication and key exchange between the MACsec peers. The CAK is not used for encrypting or decrypting the MACsec traffic. The encryption and decryption of the MACsec session is done by the Secure Association Key (SAK), which is derived from the CAK using the MKA protocol.
• SAK is not generated using this key. This is because the CAK named FFFF has the type preceding, which means that it is a legacy key that is used for backward compatibility with older MACsec devices. The preceding key is not used for generating the SAK, but only for authenticating the MACsec peers. The SAK is generated using the active key, which is the CAK named EEEE in this case.

References: Juniper Security, Professional (JNCIP-SEC) Reference Materials source and documents: https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/reference/command-summary/show-security-mka-sessions-summary.html https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/security-macsec-overview.html

According to the Juniper documentation, a custom block list feed is a user-defined list of IP addresses or URLs that are considered malicious or unwanted. A custom block list feed can be configured to override the default Juniper Seclntel block list feed, which is a cloud-based service that provides a list of known malicious IP addresses and URLs. To override the Juniper Seclntel block list feed, the custom block list feed must have a higher priority value than the Juniper Seclntel block list feed. In the exhibit, the custom block list feed has a priority value of 10, which is higher than the default priority value of 5 for the Juniper Seclntel block list feed. Therefore, this custom block list feed will be used instead of the Juniper Seclntel block list feed. References: : [Configuring Custom Block List Feeds]

https://kb.juniper.net/InfoCenter/index?page=content &id=KB30443&cat=SRX_SERIES&actp=LIST

To create a secure fabric in your company’s network, you need to know the following facts:

• A secure fabric is a collection of sites that contain network devices (switches, routers, firewalls, and other security devices) that are used in policy enforcement groups. A site is a grouping of network devices that contribute to threat prevention. When threat prevention policies are applied to policy enforcement groups, the system automatically discovers to which sites those groups belong. This is how threat prevention is aggregated across your secure fabric1.
• MX Series devices associated with tenants can belong to multiple sites. Tenants are logical partitions of the network that can have their own security policies and enforcement points. Sites that are associated with tenants do not need switches as enforcement points, because MX Series devices can perform tenant-based policy enforcement1.
• SRX Series devices can belong to only one site. SRX Series devices are firewalls that can act as perimeter enforcement points for the secure fabric. They can send potentially malicious objects and files to the Juniper ATP Cloud for analysis and receive threat intelligence from the Juniper ATP Cloud to block malicious traffic. SRX Series devices cannot belong to multiple sites, because they do not support tenant-based policy enforcement1.
• A switch must be assigned to the site to enforce an infected host policy within the network. An infected host policy is a policy that blocks or quarantines hosts that are identified as infected by the Juniper ATP Cloud. A switch can act as an internal enforcement point for the secure fabric by applying the infected host policy to the hosts that are connected to it. A switch must be assigned to the site where the infected hosts are located, because SRX Series devices cannot enforce infected host policies1.
• Switches and connectors cannot be added to the same site. Connectors are software agents that can be installed on Windows or Linux servers to enable them to act as enforcement points for the secure fabric. Connectors can apply infected host policies to the hosts that are connected to them. However, connectors cannot coexist with switches in the same site, because they use different methods of policy enforcement. Switches use VLANs and ACLs, while connectors use IPtables and WFP1.

Therefore, the correct answer is B, D, and E. The other options are incorrect because:

• A. MX Series devices associated with tenants can belong to multiple sites, not only one site1.
• C. SRX Series devices can belong to only one site, not multiple sites1.

References:

• Secure Fabric Overview

https://www.juniper.net/documentation/us/en/software/junos/multicast-l2/topics/ref/statement/family-ethernet-switching-edit-interfaces-qfx-series.html#statement-name-statement__d26608e73

Juniper MX and SRX series devices support the integration of Seclntel feeds, which provide information about known command and control servers, for the purpose of blocking access to them. These devices can be configured to use the Seclntel feeds without the need for Security Director to manage the feeds.

EX series and QFX series devices are not capable of working in this situation, as they do not support the integration of Seclntel feeds.

According to the Juniper documentation, the two Juniper devices that work in this situation are MX Series devices and SRX Series devices. These devices can use the Juniper SecIntel feeds to block access to known command and control servers without using Security Director to manage the feeds. The Juniper SecIntel feeds are curated and verified threat intelligence data that are continuously collected from Juniper ATP Cloud, Juniper Threat Labs, and other sources. The SecIntel feeds include command and control IPs, URLs, certificate hashes, and domains that are used by attackers to control malware or maintain their connection to the network1.

The MX Series devices and the SRX Series devices can subscribe to the SecIntel feeds by using the following steps:

• Configure the SecIntel service on the device by specifying the SecIntel URL, the SecIntel policy, and the SecIntel license2.
• Configure the SecIntel policy on the device by specifying the SecIntel feeds, the SecIntel actions, and the SecIntel logging3.
• Apply the SecIntel policy to the security zones or the firewall policies on the device by using the secintel-policy option4.

Once the SecIntel service is configured and applied, the MX Series devices and the SRX Series devices will receive the SecIntel feeds from Juniper ATP Cloud and use them to block the traffic from or to the command and control servers. The SecIntel service will also send the SecIntel logs to Juniper ATP Cloud or a third-party SIEM solution for further analysis and reporting.

The following devices are not suitable or incorrect for this situation:

• EX Series devices: EX Series devices are Ethernet switches that can integrate with SecIntel to block infected hosts at the switch port. However, they cannot use the SecIntel feeds to block command and control servers, as they do not support the SecIntel service or policy.
• QFX Series devices: QFX Series devices are Ethernet switches that can integrate with SecIntel to block infected hosts at the switch port. However, they cannot use the SecIntel feeds to block command and control servers, as they do not support the SecIntel service or policy.

References: 1: SecIntel Threat Intelligence 2: Configuring SecIntel Service 3: Configuring SecIntel Policy 4: Applying SecIntel Policy : [SecIntel Logging] : [SecIntel Integration with EX Series Switches] : [SecIntel Integration with QFX Series Switches]

To share threat intelligence from your environment with third party tools, you need to enable Juniper ATP Cloud to share threat intelligence and configure application tokens in the Juniper ATP Cloud to limit who has access. The other options are incorrect because:

• A. Configuring application tokens in the SRX Series firewalls is not necessary or sufficient to share threat intelligence with third party tools. Application tokens are used to authenticate and authorize requests to the Juniper ATP Cloud API, which can be used to perform various operations such as submitting files, querying C&C feeds, and managing allowlists and blocklists1. However, to share threat intelligence with third party tools, you need to enable the TAXII service in the Juniper ATP Cloud, which is a different protocol for exchanging threat information2.
• D. Enabling SRX Series firewalls to share threat intelligence with third party tools is not possible or supported. SRX Series firewalls can send potentially malicious objects and files to the Juniper ATP Cloud for analysis and receive threat intelligence from the Juniper ATP Cloud to block malicious traffic3. However, SRX Series firewalls cannot directly share threat intelligence with third party tools. You need to use the Juniper ATP Cloud as the intermediary for threat intelligence sharing.

Therefore, the correct answer is B and C. You need to enable Juniper ATP Cloud to share threat intelligence and configure application tokens in the Juniper ATP Cloud to limit who has access. To do so, you need to perform the following steps:

• Enable and configure the TAXII service in the Juniper ATP Cloud. TAXII (Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information) is a protocol for communication over HTTPS of threat information between parties. STIX (Structured Threat Information eXpression) is a language used for reporting and sharing threat information using TAXII. Juniper ATP Cloud can contribute to STIX reports by sharing the threat intelligence it gathers from file scanning. Juniper ATP Cloud also uses threat information from STIX reports as well as other sources for threat prevention2. To enable and configure the TAXII service, you need to select Configure > Threat Intelligence Sharing in the Juniper ATP Cloud WebUI, move the knob to the right to Enable TAXII, and move the slidebar to designate a file sharing threshold2.
• Configure application tokens in the Juniper ATP Cloud. Application tokens are used to authenticate and authorize requests to the Juniper ATP Cloud API and the TAXII service. You can create and manage application tokens in the Juniper ATP Cloud WebUI by selecting Configure > Application Tokens. You can specify the name, description, expiration date, and permissions of each token. You can also revoke or delete tokens as needed. You can use the application tokens to limit who has access to your shared threat intelligence by granting or denying permissions to the TAXII service1.

References:

• Threat Intelligence Open API Setup Guide
• Configure Threat Intelligence Sharing
• About Juniper Advanced Threat Prevention Cloud

https://www.juniper.net/documentation//en_US/junos/topics/concept/firewall-filter-ex-series-evaluation-understanding.html

The exhibit shows the configuration of filter-based forwarding on an SRX Series device. Filter-based forwarding is a feature that allows the device to use firewall filters to direct traffic to different routing instances based on the match criteria. In this scenario, the device has two routing instances - ISP-1 and ISP-2 - and two firewall filters - FBF and FBF-ISP-1. The FBF filter is applied to the ge-0/0/1 interface as an input filter. The FBF filter has one term that matches the traffic from the 172.25.0.0/24 network and directs it to the ISP-1 routing instance. The ISP-1 routing instance has a static route to the next hop 172.20.0.2. The FBF-ISP-1 filter is applied to the ge-0/0/0 interface as an output filter. The FBF-ISP-1 filter has one term that matches the traffic to the 172.20.0.2 next hop and sets the forwarding class to expedited-forwarding.

The problem in this scenario is that the traffic from the other network (172.25.1.0/24) is not being forwarded to the upstream 172.21.0.2 neighbor. This is because the FBF filter does not have a term that accepts the traffic from the 172.25.1.0/24 network. The FBF filter only has one term that matches the traffic from the 172.25.0.0/24 network and directs it to the ISP-1 routing instance. The traffic from the 172.25.1.0/24 network does not match this term and is therefore discarded by the implicit deny action at the end of the filter. The traffic from the 172.25.1.0/24 network should be forwarded to the ISP-2 routing instance, which has a static default route to the next hop 172.21.0.2.

To solve this problem, you must add another term to the FBF filter to accept the traffic from the 172.25.1.0/24 network. This term should have the action accept, which means that the traffic will be forwarded according to the routing table of the master routing instance. The master routing instance has a static default route to the ISP-2 routing instance, which in turn has a static default route to the next hop 172.21.0.2. By adding this term, the traffic from the 172.25.1.0/24 network will be forwarded to the upstream 172.21.0.2 neighbor as expected.

The configuration of the new term in the FBF filter could look something like this:

[edit firewall family inet filter FBF] term 2 { from { source-address { 172.25.1.0/24; } } then { accept; } }

References: Juniper Security, Professional (JNCIP-SEC) Reference Materials source and documents: https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/firewall-filter-option-filter-based-forwarding-overview.html https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/example/filter-based-forwarding-example.html

https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/release-independent/jatp/topics/topic-map/jatp-custom-log-ingestion.html

To enforce IDP policies on HTTP traffic on an SRX Series device, the following actions must be performed:

• Choose an attacks type in the predefined-attacks-group HTTP-All: This allows the SRX Series device to match on specific types of attacks that can occur within HTTP traffic. For example, it can match on SQL injection or cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks.
• Match on application junos-http: This allows the SRX Series device to match on HTTP traffic specifically, as opposed to other types of traffic. It is necessary to properly identify the traffic that needs to be protected.

Disabling screen options on the Untrust zone and specifying an action of None are not necessary to enforce IDP policies on HTTP traffic. The first one is a feature used to prevent certain types of attacks, the second one is used to take no action in case of a match.

The two types of source NAT translations that are supported in this scenario are translation of IPv4 hosts to IPv6 hosts with or without port address translation, and translation of one IPv6 subnet to another IPv6 subnet without port address translation. These are the types of source NAT translations that are supported by the Junos OS for IPv6 NAT. Translation of IPv4 hosts to IPv6 hosts allows IPv4-only hosts to communicate with IPv6-only hosts by changing the source IPv4 address to a corresponding IPv6 address. Port address translation can be optionally enabled to conserve IPv6 addresses by using different port numbers for different sessions. Translation of one IPv6 subnet to another IPv6 subnet allows IPv6 hosts to use a different IPv6 address range for outbound traffic, such as for security or policy reasons. Port address translation is not supported for this type of translation, as IPv6 addresses are abundant and do not need to be conserved. References: Juniper Security, Professional (JNCIP-SEC) Reference Materials source and documents: https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/security-nat-ipv6-overview.html

The appropriate mitigation actions for the selected incident are to block malware IP addresses (download server or CnC server) and to deploy IVP integration (if configured) to confirm if the endpoint has executed the malware and is infected. This is because the incident shows a progression level of “Download” in the kill chain, which means that the malware has been downloaded and is likely to be executed. Blocking the malware IP addresses can prevent further communication with the malicious server and stop the malware from receiving commands or exfiltrating data. Deploying IVP integration can help verify the infection status of the endpoint and provide additional information about the malware behavior and impact. IVP integration is an optional feature that allows the ATP Appliance to interact with third-party endpoint security solutions such as Carbon Black, Cylance, and CrowdStrike. References:

• Advanced Threat Prevention Appliance Solution Brief
• Advanced Threat Prevention Appliance Datasheet
• [Advanced Threat Prevention Appliance Mitigation Actions]
• [Advanced Threat Prevention Appliance IVP Integration]

DNS doctoring is a feature that allows the SRX Series firewall to modify the IP address in a DNS response based on a static NAT rule. This can be useful when the DNS server returns an IP address that is not reachable by the client, such as a private IP address or an IP address from a different network. To use DNS doctoring, the following requirements must be met:

• The DNS ALG must be enabled. The DNS ALG is responsible for parsing the DNS messages and performing the IP address translation. The DNS ALG can be enabled globally or per security policy. To enable the DNS ALG globally, use the command set security alg dns enable. To enable the DNS ALG per security policy, use the command set security policies from-zone zone1 to-zone zone2 policy policy1 then permit application-services application-firewall rule-set rule-set-name application junos-dns.
• Static NAT must be configured for the IP address that needs to be translated. Static NAT is a type of NAT that maps a fixed IP address to another fixed IP address. Static NAT can be configured using the command set security nat static rule-set rule-set-name rule rule-name match destination-address address and set security nat static rule-set rule-set-name rule rule-name then static-nat prefix prefix. References:
• DNS ALG and Doctoring Support
• Understanding DNS ALG and NAT Doctoring
• Disabling DNS ALG and NAT Doctoring
• SRX Getting Started - Configure DNS

The SRX Series device in transparent mode uses packet flooding to learn about unknown devices in a network. Packet flooding is a process wherein the device sends out packets to every device it knows about or suspects in the network. When the packets are returned, the device can identify and classify the unknown devices in the network.

The exhibit shows the output of the show security macsec statistics interface ge-0/0/70 detail command on an SRX Series device. This command displays the statistics for the Media Access Control Security (MACsec) feature on the ge-0/0/70 interface. MACsec is a feature that provides point-to-point security on Ethernet links by using encryption and data integrity checks. MACsec uses two types of keys to secure the traffic: the Connectivity Association Key (CAK) and the Secure Association Key (SAK). The CAK is used for authentication and key exchange between the MACsec peers. The SAK is used for encryption and decryption of the MACsec traffic.

The two statements that are true based on the exhibit are:

• The data that traverses the ge-0/0/70 interface is secured by a secure association key. This is because the exhibit shows that the interface has a Secure Channel (SC) and a Secure Association (SA) established. The SC is a logical connection between the MACsec peers that carries the encrypted traffic. The SA is a subset of the SC that contains the SAK and other parameters for encrypting and decrypting the traffic. The exhibit shows that the interface has encrypted and protected packets, which means that the traffic is secured by the SAK.
• The data that traverses the ge-0/0/70 interface cannot be intercepted and read by anyone. This is because the exhibit shows that the interface has encryption enabled. The encryption option indicates whether the MACsec traffic is encrypted or not. If encryption is enabled, the traffic is encrypted by the SAK and cannot be viewed by anyone monitoring the link. If encryption is disabled, the traffic is only protected by the SAK and can be viewed by anyone monitoring the link.

References: Juniper Security, Professional (JNCIP-SEC) Reference Materials source and documents: https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/reference/command-summary/show-security-macsec-statistics-interface-detail.html https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/security-macsec-overview.html

To provide single sign-on (SSO) to Juniper ATP Cloud, you need to configure the following:

• Microsoft Azure as the identity provider (IdP): This allows users to authenticate to Juniper ATP Cloud using their Azure credentials.
• Juniper ATP Cloud as the service provider (SP): This allows Juniper ATP Cloud to accept the authentication from Microsoft Azure and provide SSO access to the users.

Configuring Microsoft Azure as the service provider (SP) and Juniper ATP Cloud as the identity provider (IdP) are not the correct steps to provide SSO, as the roles are reversed.

According to the Juniper documentation, reflexive NAT is a type of source NAT that allows an internal host to communicate with an external host using a single public IP address and port. The reflexive NAT session is created when the internal host initiates the traffic to the external host, and the session is deleted when the traffic stops. The reflexive NAT session is bidirectional, meaning that the external host can send traffic back to the internal host using the same public IP address and port that the internal host used to reach the external host. However, the external host cannot initiate a new session to the internal host using the same public IP address and port, unless the internal host has already established a session with the external host. Therefore, only the Internet host that the internal host originally communicated with can initiate traffic to reach the internal host using the 203.0.113.1 address, a random source port, and destination port 54311. References: [Configuring Reflexive NAT]

To modify the configuration to fulfill the requirements, you need to modify the log-all term to add the next term action. The other options are incorrect because:

• B. Deleting the log-all term would prevent logging all traffic, which is one of the requirements. The log-all term matches all traffic from any source address and logs it to the system log file1.
• C. Adding a term before the log-all term that blocks Telnet would also prevent logging all traffic, because the log-all term would never be reached. The firewall filter evaluates the terms in sequential order and applies the first matching term. If a term before the log-all term blocks Telnet, then the log-all term would not match any traffic and no logging would occur2.
• D. Applying a firewall filter to the loopback interface that blocks Telnet traffic would not block inbound Telnet traffic on interface ge-0/0/3, which is another requirement. The loopback interface is a logical interface that is always up and reachable. It is used for routing and management purposes, not for filtering traffic on physical interfaces3.

Therefore, the correct answer is A. You need to modify the log-all term to add the next term action. The next term action instructs the firewall filter to continue evaluating the subsequent terms after matching the current term. This way, the log-all term would log all traffic and then proceed to the block-telnet term, which would block only inbound Telnet traffic on interface ge-0/0/34. To modify the log-all term to add the next term action, you need to perform the following steps:

• Enter the configuration mode: user@host> configure
• Navigate to the firewall filter hierarchy: user@host# edit firewall family inet filter block-telnet
• Add the next term action to the log-all term: user@host# set term log-all then next term
• Commit the changes: user@host# commit

References:

• log (Firewall Filter Action)
• Firewall Filter Configuration Overview
• loopback (Interfaces)
• next term (Firewall Filter Action)

https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/topic-map/security-pr ofile-logical-system.html

The exhibit shows a security policy configuration with a threshold of 1000 policy violations by a source network identifier and a threshold of 10 policy violations to an application within a specified period. If either of these thresholds are exceeded, an alarm will be generated. Therefore, the correct answer is A and D. The other options are incorrect because:

• B. The ratio of policy violation traffic compared to accepted traffic is not a criterion for triggering an alarm. The security policy configuration does not specify any ratio or percentage of policy violation traffic that would cause an alarm.
• C. The number of policy violation by a destination TCP port is also not a criterion for triggering an alarm. The security policy configuration does not specify any threshold or duration for policy violation by a destination TCP port.

References:

• policy (Security Alarms)
• Monitoring Security Policy Violations

https://www.juniper.net/us/en/local/pdf/app-notes/3500202-en.pdf

According to the Juniper documentation, the steps to detect domain generation algorithms (DGA) on an SRX Series firewall are as follows:

• Define a security-metadata-streaming policy under [edit services]. A security-metadata-streaming policy is a configuration that enables the SRX Series firewall to collect and stream security metadata, such as DNS queries and responses, to Juniper ATP Cloud for analysis. Juniper ATP Cloud uses machine learning models and known pre-computed DGA domain names to provide domain verdicts, which helps in-line blocking and sinkholing of DNS queries on SRX Series firewalls1. You can define a security-metadata-streaming policy by using the following command:

set services security-metadata-streaming policy

• Attach the security-metadata-streaming policy to a security zone. A security zone is a logical grouping of interfaces that have similar security requirements. You can attach the security-metadata-streaming policy to a security zone by using the following command:

set security zones security-zone services security-metadata-streaming policy

The following steps are not required or incorrect:

• Define an advanced-anti-malware policy under [edit services]. An advanced-anti-malware policy is a configuration that enables the SRX Series firewall to scan files for malware using Juniper ATP Cloud. It is not related to DGA detection2.
• Attach the advanced-anti-malware policy to a security policy. A security policy is a configuration that defines the rules for permitting or denying traffic between security zones. It is not related to DGA detection3.

References: 1: Configuring Security Metadata Streaming 2: Configuring Advanced Anti-Malware Policies 3: Configuring Security Policies

The output shown in the exhibit is from the command “show security flow session family inet6”. This command displays the IPv6 flow sessions on the SRX Series device. The output shows that there are two total sessions, both of which are valid. This means that the SRX Series device is configured with flow-based IPv6 forwarding options. Flow-based IPv6 forwarding options enable the device to process IPv6 packets using the security policies, NAT, and other security features. To configure flow-based IPv6 forwarding options, use the command set security forwarding-options family inet6 mode flow-based and reboot the device. References:

• show security flow session family inet6
• Configuring Flow-Based IPv6 Forwarding Options
• SRX Getting Started - Configure IPv6

Your company wants to take your Juniper ATP Appliance into private mode. You must give them a list of impacted features for this request. The two features that are impacted in this scenario are:

• A. False Positive Reporting. False Positive Reporting is a feature that allows you to report false positive detections to Juniper Networks for analysis and improvement. False Positive Reporting requires an Internet connection to send the reports to Juniper Networks. If you take your Juniper ATP Appliance into private mode, False Positive Reporting will be disabled and you will not be able to report false positives1.
• C. GSS Telemetry. GSS Telemetry is a feature that allows you to send anonymized threat data to Juniper Networks for analysis and improvement. GSS Telemetry requires an Internet connection to send the data to Juniper Networks. If you take your Juniper ATP Appliance into private mode, GSS Telemetry will be disabled and you will not be able to contribute to the threat intelligence community2.

The other options are incorrect because:

• B. Threat Progression Monitoring. Threat Progression Monitoring is a feature that allows you to monitor the threat activity and progression across your network. Threat Progression Monitoring does not require an Internet connection and can be performed locally by the Juniper ATP Appliance. If you take your Juniper ATP Appliance into private mode, Threat Progression Monitoring will not be impacted and you will still be able to monitor the threat activity and progression3.
• D. Cyber Kill Chain mapping. Cyber Kill Chain mapping is a feature that allows you to map the threat activity and progression to the stages of the Cyber Kill Chain framework. Cyber Kill Chain mapping does not require an Internet connection and can be performed locally by the Juniper ATP Appliance. If you take your Juniper ATP Appliance into private mode, Cyber Kill Chain mapping will not be impacted and you will still be able to map the threat activity and progression4.

References:

• False Positive Reporting
• GSS Telemetry
• Threat Progression Monitoring
• Cyber Kill Chain Mapping